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Abstract: Market definition is an essential ingredient to competitive and 
regulatory analysis. Yet, there is significant disparity regarding the definition 
of the relevant geographic market for high-capacity circuits, commonly re-
ferred to as Special Access services. Given the present debate over expanding 
price regulation in this sector, the importance of market definition on the ex-
pected economic effects of regulation is worth evaluating. In this article, we 
demonstrate that if geographic markets are “location specific” and supplied by 
a monopolist as the proponents of regulation claim, then price regulation re-
duces economic welfare in all instances. That is, even with monopoly supply, 
regulation offers no improvement in economic welfare, meaning the debates 
over the extent of competition and profit margins in such markets are irrele-
vant. The effect of regulation is mostly to transfer profits from sellers to buy-
ers, so the debate appears to be largely a squabble over rents. That said, every 
$1 of transfer costs more than $1 to society, so regulation reduces welfare. 
This analysis demonstrates that the present case for regulating high-capacity 
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Businesses and other telecom service providers, such as wireless carriers, 
use high capacity “special access” circuits to provide reliable and guaranteed 
bandwidth between business locations, cell phone towers and, increasingly, the 
public Internet.1 The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) tradition-
ally regulated high capacity circuits pursuant to rate-of-return and, later, price 
cap regulation, but beginning in 1999 the FCC began to grant incumbent tele-
phone exchange carriers (“incumbent LECs”) pricing flexibility on a metro-
politan statistical areas (“MSAs”) basis if the incumbent LEC documented the 
presence of alternative competitive facilities.2 
                                                      
 1 See In re Special Access for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers, Report and Order, 
27 F.C.C.R. 10,557, 10,558 n.1 (Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Special Access Order] (“The 
term ‘special access services’ encompasses all services that do not use local switches; these 
include services that employ dedicated facilities that run directly between the end user and 
an IXC’s point of presence, where an IXC connects its network with the LEC network, or 
between two discrete end user locations.”). 
 2 In re Access Change Reform; Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange 
Carriers; Interexchange Carrier Purchases of Switched Access Services Offered by Com-
petitive Local Exchange Carriers; Petition of US West Communications, Inc. for Forbear-
(Footnote Continued. . . .) 
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As with every FCC action, the FCC’s Pricing Flexibility Order had its de-
tractors, and the efforts to reverse the decision intensified when the Obama 
Administration came into power.3 The FCC finally acceded to this pressure, 
and August 2012 the agency released a Report and Order which found that its 
“existing collocation triggers are a poor proxy for the presence of competition 
sufficient to constrain special access prices or deter anticompetitive practices 
throughout an MSA.”4 Given this change of heart, the Commission took the 
bold step of suspending, on an “interim” basis, its rules allowing for automatic 
grants of pricing flexibility for special access services “pending adoption of a 
new framework that will allow us to ensure that special access prices are fair 
and competitive in all areas of the country.”5 
The concept of “interim” can take on a bizarre definition in Washington,6 so 
it should come as no surprise that two years after releasing this Report and 
Order the Commission has yet to release its promised “new framework.” 
While we have no insight as to what might be causing the delay, given the his-
tory of the docket, we can surmise that there is a significant debate on how the 
Commission should define the relevant economic market for high capacity 
                                                                                                                              
ance from Regulation As a Dominant Carrier in the Phoenix, Arizona MSA, Fifth Report 
and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 14,221, 14,231 (Aug. 
27, 1999) [hereinafter Pricing Flexibility Order], aff’d sub nom., WorldCom, Inc. v. F.C.C., 
238 F.3d 449 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 3 See, e.g., Memorandum from COMPTEL to Susan Crawford and Haley VanDyck 3–
5 (Dec. 19, 2008) (citing studies for the assertion that current prices are too high), available 
at http://commcns.org/1gw2d1o; In re Ameritech Operating Cos., Letter from Thomas 
Jones, Partner, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, on behalf of Time Warner Telecom Inc., to 
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, WC Docket Nos. 06-125, 05-25 
(Jan. 15, 2008), available at http://commcns.org/1pcev1R; In re Special Access Rates for 
Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers, Comments of the Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users 
Committee: L.L. Selwyn et al., Special Access Overpricing and the US Economy: How Un-
checked RBOC Market Power Is Costing US Jobs and Impairing US Competitiveness, CC 
Docket No. 05-25 app. 1 (Aug. 8, 2007), available at http://commcns.org/1jVNfT6; PLI: 
Panelists See Full Telecom Policy Plate in 2009 As FCC Adjusts to New Leadership, Ad-
ministration, TELECOMM. REP. (Jan. 1, 2009) (quoting Sprint Nextel Corp. Chief Executive 
Officer Dan Hesse’s call for the Obama administration to push for an overhaul of the “bro-
ken” special access regime, because it is “thwarting the deployment of broadband serv-
ices”); see also Sprint Nextel Corp., Special Access Pricing, Written Ex Parte Presentation, 
W.C. Docket No. 05-25, at 60 (Oct. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Sprint Written Ex Parte Presenta-
tion], available at http://commcns.org/SHoyi0; PETER BLUHM & ROBERT LOUBE, NAT’L 
REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., COMPETITIVE ISSUES IN SPECIAL ACCESS MARKETS (rev. ed. 
2009), available at http://commcns.org/RupMvF. 
 4 Special Access Order, supra note 1, at 10,560. 
 5 Id. 
 6 OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 9, available at 
http://commcns.org/1hrXkSe (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
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circuits for purposes of this new competitive analysis.7 For example, many 
suppliers of special access argue that the market for high capacity circuits 
should be national.8 In contrast, proponents of price regulation for high capac-
ity circuits (generally, purchasers of high capacity circuits) argue for narrow 
market definitions, such as a building or cell tower.9 Other studies propose 
                                                      
 7 George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, The Need for Better Analysis of High Capac-
ity Services, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 343, 381–82 (2011) (noting that “the 
central problem of market definition derives from the confusion between the geographic 
market for purposes of economic analysis (e.g., HHI calculations) and the administrative 
market for purposes of regulating or deregulating prices”); see also George S. Ford & Law-
rence J. Spiwak, Set It and Forget It? Market Power and the Consequences of Premature 
Deregulation in Telecommunications Markets, PHX. CENTER POL’Y PAPER NO. 18 (2003), 
available at http://commcns.org/1nNCArU, reprinted in 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 675 (2005). 
 8 See, e.g., In re Petition of AT&T Inc. for Forbearance under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from 
Title II and Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to Its Broadband Services, July 23, 2008 
Petition of AT&T, WC Docket No. 06-125, at 5 (“[B]broadband competition is national in 
scope and is not limited to . . . the territory of any specific BOC.”); In re Petition of the 
Verizon Telephone Companies for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § l60(c) From Title II and 
Computer Inquiry Rules with Respect to Their Broadband Services, March 10, 2004 Reply 
Comments of Verizon, WC Docket No. 04-440, at 18 (“[I]t is appropriate for the Commis-
sion to focus on national data, and that is all the more true given that national patterns with 
respect to broadband availability and competition hold true throughout our service areas.  
Therefore, reliance on national data in the [sic] context is justified.”). 
 9 See infra note 25. 
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multiple definitions,10 meanwhile others simply choose to avoid the issue alto-
gether.11 
Much of the disagreements on market definition stem from the fact that 
there are effectively two types of market definition for purposes of regulating 
high capacity services. First, there is the “economic” market, whose bounda-
ries are determined using the standard economic approach.12 According 
Kaserman and Mayo, the “economic market”: 
[I]nvolves identification of a group of buyers and a corresponding 
group of sellers whose purchase and output decisions determine the 
equilibrium price.  Moreover, these groups must be delineated across 
both geographic and product space. In other words, market definition 
requires the identification of both geographic and product boundaries 
that separate buyers and sellers whose actions influence price from 
buyers and sellers whose actions do not influence price.  The market 
                                                      
 10 For example, the NRRI fails to define the relevant economic geographic market.  At 
first, the NRRI Study claims to “estimate HHI for each MSA.”  BLUHM & LOUBE, supra 
note 3, at 40.  However, on the next page, the authors calculate an HHI for the “nation” and 
then “by city.” Id. at 41.  The authors also observe that “there is considerable geographic 
variation from city to city” and that the “level of competition varies by location.”  Id. at 46, 
79.  Finally, the authors recommend that the FCC “adopt a finer (more granular) [geo-
graphic] scale in making decisions about the competitiveness of special access markets.” Id. 
at 91.  In so doing, the authors recommend that regulators consider the possibility that mar-
kets for high capacity services may be a “building” or “city block[],” or perhaps requiring 
GIS software to measure geographic market boundaries. Id. at 88, 93–94.  Not all of these 
options can simultaneously be legitimate definitions of the “geographic market,” and with-
out such a defined market, there can be no meaningful calculation of market concentration.  
While most of the calculations of the HHI in the NRRI Study are at high level of aggrega-
tion (city, MSA, or nation), the authors suggest throughout the Report that Special Access 
markets are in fact very small.  The narrow geographic markets are further stressed, with the 
authors stating, “[g]eographic differences in concentration can identify particular areas 
where existing policies are succeeding or failing, and that in turn can suggest policy refine-
ments,” or “[g]eographic price differences can identify areas where competition is sharpest 
and can lead to more effective regulatory policy.”  Id. at 86. Furthermore, they argue that 
“finer” market definitions “could more accurately identify the boundaries of special access 
competition.”  Id. at 91. 
 11 The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) in particular avoids the term “mar-
ket” altogether, using “area” in its place. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
FICE, GAO-07-80, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: FCC NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS ABILITY TO MONI-
TOR AND DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF COMPETITION IN DEDICATED ACCESS SERVICES (2006) 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT (GAO-07-80)], available at http://commcns.org/1nNCIaY. 
 12 Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated 
Approach, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 3, 5–6 (1984). 
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definition exercise is one of the (if not the) most important aspects of 
many antitrust cases . . . . 13 
Definition of the economic market involves clear delineation of both the prod-
uct and geographic boundaries of exchange. Only after such delineation can 
one compute a concentration index and then make claims about the presence or 
lack thereof of market power. 
In contrast, the “administrative” market relates to the application or removal 
of regulatory rules.14 An administrative market may contain many economic 
markets, or may be a subset of an economic market (for instance, special 
treatment for the poor or handicapped within an economic market).  Adminis-
trative markets are not bound by the criteria for defining an economic market.15  
Delineation of the administrative market relates to minimizing the cost or 
maximizing the benefits of a particular regulatory regime. 
The distinction between economic and administrative markets is plain in the 
FCC’s Pricing Flexibility Order,16 where the administrative market was se-
lected as the Metropolitan Statistical Area or “MSA.”17 In that decision, the 
FCC acknowledged that economic markets are likely smaller than the MSA, 
but chose the MSA as the geographic scope to which regulatory decisions 
would apply.18  This decision was based largely on administrative concerns. As 
stated in the Order, “the geographic area that . . . should [be] use[d] for pur-
poses of reviewing requests for pricing flexibility” should be defined “nar-
rowly enough so that the competitive conditions within each area are reasona-
bly similar, yet broadly enough to be administratively workable.”19 Plainly, the 
agency never defined the economic market to be the MSA20 and recognized 
that the MSA consists of many economic markets.  The D.C. Circuit upheld 
this choice.21  Alternative proposals to grant pricing flexibility at the wire cen-
                                                      
 13 DAVID L. KASERMAN & JOHN W. MAYO, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS: THE ECONOM-
ICS OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 111 (Daryl Fox et al. eds., 1995) (emphasis in original). 
 14 Pricing Flexibility Order, supra note 2, at 14,259; see also WorldCom, Inc. v. F.C.C., 
238 F.3d 449, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing the FCC’s decision to set the geographic 
bounding of the market so as to administrative workability). 
 15 Pricing Flexibility Order, supra note 2, at 14,259 (noting the importance of defining 
geographic areas “broadly enough to be administratively workable”). 
 16 See generally id. 
 17 Id. at 14,260; WorldCom, 238 F.3d at 461. 
 18 Pricing Flexibility Order, supra note 2, at 14,259. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 14,260 (limiting the MSA to functioning as a tool for measuring the extent of 
competition). 
 21 WorldCom, 238 F.3d at 461. 
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ter level, for example, are also based on administrative convenience rather than 
a formal geographic market definition.22 
While there are two distinct markets relevant to the price regulation of high 
capacity services (i.e., administrative and economic), the economic analysis of 
competition for high capacity services should focus on the economic market, 
not the administrative market. Economic analysis does offer insight on the se-
lection of administrative markets, and the competitive and administrative 
analyses are related; however, the objective functions differ between the two 
markets requiring disparate conceptual frameworks.23 It is important for pro-
posals and analyses to distinguish which market is being analyzed, so the rele-
vant economic models are properly selected. 
We recognize that there is a dispute about the geographic scope of the eco-
nomic market. Consequently, in this article we choose sides so as to trace out 
the theoretical implications of market definition. Assuming arguendo that the 
proponents of price regulation of high capacity circuits are correct in their ar-
gument that the market for high capacity circuits is geographically narrow,24 
we get a surprising and highly policy-relevant result: price regulation of high 
capacity circuits would necessarily reduce economic welfare and likely reduce 
investment in new broadband facilities. There are in fact no trade-offs to con-
sider and the extent of competition (or monopoly) essentially plays no role in 
the welfare analysis of price regulation for high capacity services. That is, even 
if high capacity services are provided by a monopolist, price regulation offers 
no increase in economic welfare. 
We obtain this result because if the market for high capacity circuits is re-
garded as a “particular customer’s location”25 served by a monopoly provider, 
then high capacity services constitute a “bilateral” monopoly—i.e., a market in 
which there is only one seller and one buyer (with perhaps unequal bargaining 
power).26 The welfare analysis in this setting is nothing like the standard, text-
                                                      
 22 BLUHM & LOUBE, supra note 3, at 93–94. 
 23 Compare Pricing Flexibility Order, supra note 2, at 14,259 (including an administra-
tive oversight as a factor in defining the scope of the market), with KASERMAN & MAYO, 
supra note 13, at 111 (defining market as requiring the identification of “geographic and 
product boundaries that separate buyers and sellers whose actions influence from price” 
from those whose actions do not). 
 24 The Need for Better Analysis of High Capacity Services, supra note 7, at 383. 
 25 In re Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI. Inc., Applications for Approval of 
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R 18,433, 18,449 (Nov. 
17, 2005). 
 26 Glossary of Statistical Terms: Bilateral Monopoly/Oligopoly, OECD, 
http://commcns.org/1mvfIxZ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (“A bilateral monopoly/oligopoly is 
a situation where there is a single (or few) buyer(s) or seller(s) of a given product in a mar-
(Footnote Continued. . . .) 
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book case of monopoly, where the monopolist seeks to raise price by restrict-
ing output. In a bilateral monopoly where one item is exchanged, there is no 
deadweight loss of monopoly, and the seller cannot reduce output to raise price 
and profits. Each circuit transaction is unique, and is either sold or left fallow, 
because there can be no arbitrage in location-specific markets. In such a set-
ting, granting a seller pricing flexibility will result in welfare maximizing 
transactions because the monopoly seller does not have the incentive to restrict 
output. Price regulation in this scenario (typically) reduces the quantity of 
transactions and (always) reduces economic welfare by either forcing welfare-
reducing transactions or blocking welfare-improving transactions. Accord-
ingly, if the underlying assumptions regarding market definition set forth by 
proponents of price regulation for high capacity services are correct, then a 
policymaker interested in maximizing economic welfare should seek to ex-
pand, not contract, pricing flexibility for these services. 
Our findings are significant because if markets are, in fact, geographically 
narrow, then many of the traditional arguments for price regulation of high 
capacity circuits are off point. For example, in a bilateral monopoly setting, 
regulation reduces welfare even under monopoly supply. Thus, the debate over 
whether the market is monopolistic or competitive is irrelevant.  Similarly, rate 
of return calculations made from regulatory account data (i.e., the FCC’s AR-
MIS data), which are of dubious merit in any case,27 are irrelevant since regula-
tion in such a setting unambiguously reduces welfare irrespective of the effect 
on returns.28 Finally, comparisons of prices across regulated and deregulated 
areas say little to nothing about whether regulation improves welfare, since 
regulation is not welfare improving. 
If the proponents of regulation are correct in their assertion that markets are 
“location specific,” then we must conclude that much of the debate over pric-
ing flexibility is not a debate about economic welfare or a new “national 
broadband strategy,” but rather a squabble over the distribution of rents be-
tween buyer and seller.29 High capacity circuits are in fact sold from one busi-
                                                                                                                              
ket. The level of concentration in the sale of purchase of the product results in a mutual 
interdependence between the seller(s) and buyer(s).”). 
 27 The Need for Better Analysis of High Capacity Services, supra note 7, at 345. 
 28 For examples of studies that try to use ARMIS data to calculate rates of return, see 
the studies put out by the National Research Institute and the Free Press. See, e.g., BLUHM & 
LOUBE, supra note 3, at 93–94; S. DEREK TURNER, FREE PRESS, DISMANTLING DIGITAL DE-
REGULATION: TOWARD A NATIONAL BROADBAND STRATEGY 57–59 (2009) available at 
http://commcns.org/1h6M2Zh. 
 29 As Cass Sunstein—President Obama’s former “regulatory czar”—once observed, 
“the strongest arguments for cost-benefit balancing are based not only on neoclassical eco-
(Footnote Continued. . . .) 
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ness to another (and usually, from one telecom provider to another). While 
shifting the gains from trade from one firm to another may seem innocuous to 
some, such shifts have welfare impacts in the bilateral monopoly context, and 
it is the role of a regulatory cost-benefit analysis to maximize overall welfare 
and not simply maximize the profits of one industry segment. Our analysis of 
the market for high capacity circuits, based on the arguments of regulatory 
proponents, indicates that it is price regulation, not monopoly, which creates a 
deadweight loss. 
Importantly, our conclusions hinge on a particular view of high capacity 
services, but this view is based on the characterizations of those pushing for 
heightened regulation of the sector. This analysis is not comprehensive, as we 
ignore some strategic behaviors many—including us in our prior work30—
claim are prevalent.  That said, price regulation is probably a poor solution to 
such strategic behavior even if it exists, given the difficulty of implementing a 
solution that is, on net, beneficial. “Effective” regulation is an elusive goal.  
Finally, we make no claim about the overall performance of the market.  
Whether high capacity services markets are competitive or not is beyond the 
scope of this article, although we believe that the available evidence is insuffi-
cient to reach a conclusion on that point.31 Our goal in this article is simple—
what are the expected welfare effects of price regulation if high capacity cir-
cuits are sold by a monopolist in very narrow markets? The answer is “not 
good.” 
In Section II below, we present our economic model. To help the reader 
grasp better that theoretical discussion, we provide a numerical example (or 
simulation) in Section III.  Conclusions are found in Section IV. 
 
II. The Welfare Effects of Price Regulating High Capacity Circuits 
 
Consistent with prior research, it is our view that all regulation should be 
subject to a cost-benefit analysis that focuses upon the welfare effects of that 
regulation and tries to account for the administrative burdens and unintended 
consequences of intervention.  In this Section, we analyze the welfare effects 
                                                                                                                              
nomics, but also on an understanding of human cognition, on democratic considerations, 
and on an assessment of the real-world record of such balancing,” CASS SUNSTEIN, THE 
COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 9 (2002).  Sunstein argued 
that using cost-benefit analysis will stop interests groups from “fending off desirable regula-
tion or pressing for regulation when argument on [their] behalf is fragile.”  Id. 
 30 See T. Randolph Beard et al., Quantity-Discount Contracts As a Barrier to Entry, 
PHX. CENTER POL’Y PAPER NO. 20, at 2–5 (2004), available at http://commcns.org/1raO66q. 
 31 The Need for Better Analysis of High Capacity Services, supra note 7, at 344. 
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of subjecting to price regulation a monopoly provider of point-to-point high 
capacity circuits. 
We recognize that many might regard our initial assumption of monopoly 
and narrow markets as dashing headlong into a minefield.  For well over a 
decade, parties have debated whether the market for high capacity circuits is 
competitive or not, as well as the type of proxies or “triggers” that might be 
used to determine whether the market is competitive or contestable.  In addi-
tion, the geographic scope of regulation (and later de-regulation) has been 
heavily debated, with many asserting that the geographic market for these 
services is far more granular than the FCC’s MSA-wide approach. 
Our approach to analyzing this problem takes a side in that we adopt the ar-
guments of those calling for more, not less regulation.  We seek an answer to 
one very specific, yet highly illuminating question: if the relevant geographic 
market for high capacity services is a highly location-specific point-to-point 
market, and if there were only a monopoly provider of such circuits, then 
would price regulation advance economic welfare?  The analysis in this Sec-
tion shows that the answer to this question is surprisingly “No.” 
 
 
A. Two Key Assumptions: Point-to-Point Geographic Markets and  
 Monopoly Source of Supply 
 
The core part of our welfare analysis is to assume that high capacity serv-
ices are sold by monopoly providers in highly granular, point-to-point geo-
graphic markets.  In this Part II.A, we describe the basis and utility of proceed-
ing with these assumptions. 
The point-to-point assumption of our analysis is not altogether a radical ap-
proach, as a common theme in the criticisms of the FCC’s approach to deregu-
lation of high capacity services regards the choice to deregulate at the level of 
MSA.  Critics claim that the MSA is too large a collection of the narrower 
geographic markets, since competition may differ considerably across the 
component markets.32  In fact, many have contended that the geographic mar-
ket is simply the connection between any two points.33  The geographic scope 
                                                      
 32 BLUHM & LOUBE, supra note 3, at 91. 
 33 In re Applications of NYNEX Corporation, Transferor, and Bell Atlantic Corpora-
tion, Transferee, for Consent to Transfer Control of NYNEX Corporation and Its Subsidiar-
ies, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 19,985, 20,015–17 (Aug. 14, 1997); see 
also BellSouth Transport - Special Access (SPA) Products, AT&T, 
http://commcns.org/1nruXJk (last visited Mar. 1, 2014); Point-to-Point Services, CINCIN-
(Footnote Continued. . . .) 
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of the market is, as some argue, the end user’s location.  For example, the 
wireless carrier Sprint, a vocal advocate for the regulation of Special Access 
services, observes “that, as a theoretical matter, the relevant geographic market 
for loops and transport is the geographic area served by a route connecting the 
two points that a purchaser seeks to link with the dedicated facility (e.g., cus-
tomer premises and central office, or central office and access tandem).”34  
Others echo the sentiment, claiming that the geographic market for high capac-
ity services is “route connecting the two points that a purchaser seeks to link 
with the dedicated facility” or “a given location or for a given facility.”35  The 
FCC has reached a similar conclusion, concluding that “the relevant geo-
                                                                                                                              
NATI BELL, http://commcns.org/1onyPNF (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
 34 Sprint Written Ex Parte Presentation, supra note 3, at 59. 
 35 In re International Comparison and Consumer Survey Requirements in the 
Broadband Data Improvement Act, A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, Inquiry 
Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans 
in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment 
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, As Amended by the 
Broadband Data Improvement Act, Comments of Cavalier Telephone, LLC to NBP Public 
Notice #1, GN Docket Nos. 09-47, 09-51, 09-137, at 5 (Nov. 5, 2009) (“Special access fa-
cilities are generally dedicated circuits that connect an end-user facility, such as a building 
in a business district, to another facility or POP, without routing through a local exchange 
switch.”); In re Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers; AT&T Corp. 
Petition for Rulemaking to Reform Regulation of Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier Rates 
for Interstate Special Access Services, Comments of Sprint Nextel Corporation, W.C. 
Docket No. 05-25, at 15 (Aug. 8, 2007) (“The relevant geographic market for special ac-
cess, therefore, is the geographic area served by a route connecting the two points that a 
purchaser seeks to link with the dedicated facility (e.g., cell site and central office, or central 
office and access tandem).”); Response Testimony of Don J. Wood at 13, In re Joint Appli-
cation of Verizon Communications, Inc. and MCI, Inc. for Approval of Agreement and Plan 
of Merger, WUTC Docket No. UT-050814 (Sept. 9, 2005) (“the market also depends on 
aggregate end user demand at a given location or for a given facility.”); Declaration of Ajay 
Govil on Behalf of XO Communications, LLC at 7, In re Minnesota Public Utilities Inquiry 
Regarding the Petition of Qwest Corporation, Filed with the Federal Communications 
Commission, for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. Section 160(c) in the Minneapolis-St. 
Paul Minnesota Metropolitan Statistical Area, MPUC Docket No. P421/CI-07-661 (Aug. 
16, 2007) (“A loop facility is dedicated to the use of one customer or in limited instances a 
very small group of customers.”); Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLEC), VERIZON, 
http://commcns.org/1raOguF (last visited Mar. 1, 2014) (“As demand in network capacity 
continues to increase to support high bandwidth services and when bandwidth requirements 
between two locations are very large, Optical Wave Service may be your preferred solution 
for interconnectivity.”); In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incum-
bent Local Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, Report and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16,978, 17,175 (Aug. 21, 2003) (“impairment analysis 
should be applied on a customer-by-customer location basis.”). 
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graphic market for wholesale special access services is a particular customer’s 
location . . .”36  In its Pricing Flexibility Order, the FCC explicitly embraced 
the legitimacy of a more narrow market definition, admitting it “might produce 
a more finely-tuned picture of competitive conditions . . .”37  Likewise, the 
agency also observed that it would not delay “regulatory relief until access 
customers have a competitive alternative for access to every end user,” again 
suggesting a view of a more narrow market definition than the MSA.38 
In its recent study, NRRI echoed the sentiment and “recommend[ed] that the 
FCC adopt a finer (more granular) scale in making decisions about the com-
petitiveness of special access markets. [NRRI’s] recommendation applie[d] 
with particular force to channel terminations.”39  The study stated that the FCC, 
in one of its earlier decisions, had “simply and unambiguously” defined the 
geographic market for high capacity services as a “particular customer’s loca-
tion.”40  As alternatives to MSA level flexibility, NRRI proposed a geographic 
unit of measurement of a city block, and possibly using even GIS mapping to 
set narrow market boundaries for the computation of market share statistics.41 
Whether the actual geographic (economic) market for high capacity services 
is a “particular customer’s location” is debatable, though widely accepted.  As 
such, we do not challenge this definition of the geographic market in this arti-
cle; rather, we base our modeling assumptions on it. Such an approach seems 
reasonable, since this definition of the “market” is consistent with the position 
of those proposing more strict regulation of high capacity services. As a result, 
we study the welfare impact of price regulation in a geographic market defined 
to be a particular customer location. 
The other key assumption of our model is that point-to-point high capacity 
circuits are provided by a monopoly. A central feature of the advocacy in favor 
of stricter regulation focuses upon the purported lack of competition in the 
provision of high capacity services. For example, the wireless carrier Sprint 
asserts that for the majority of lower-capacity services, special access custom-
ers do not have competitive alternatives to the price cap LECs’ offerings.42  
Likewise, the wireless carrier T-Mobile, another advocate for regulating Spe-
                                                      
 36 In re Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of 
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,433, 18,446 (Nov. 
17, 2005). 
 37 Pricing Flexibility Order, supra note 2, at 14,260. 
 38 Id. at 14,298. 
 39 BLUHM & LOUBE, supra note 3, at 91. 
 40 Id. at 92. 
 41 Id. at 94. 
 42 Sprint Written Ex Parte Presentation, supra note 3, at 18. 
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cial Access prices, claims that price cap ILECs are the “sole source” of high 
capacity services at nearly all of its cell sites.43 The GAO study on high capac-
ity services summarizes data showing that only 6% of buildings with DS1 or 
greater demand have a competitive alternative, though this number was much 
higher for locations with DS3 or higher demand levels.44 According to NRRI’s 
study, “ILECs still have strong market power in most geographic areas, par-
ticularly for channel terminations and DS-1 services.”45 In both of these two 
studies, however, the authors explicitly recognized that the extent of competi-
tive alternatives for high capacity services is exceedingly difficult to measure.  
There are no centralized databases of competitive alternatives, and the “ab-
sence of evidence” is not “evidence of absence.” A more rigorous analysis of 
high capacity services than has occurred to date is required to understand fully 
the costs and benefits of regulatory intervention. 
We suspect the debate over the extent of competition for high capacity cir-
cuits will continue unimpeded, but it is beyond the scope of this article to re-
ject or embrace the legitimacy of the monopoly or competitive claims.46 In-
deed, we believe that our welfare analysis of subjecting a monopoly supplier to 
price regulation is a liberating approach, because it shows that debates over 
market structure and actual versus potential competition are largely irrelevant. 
Simply stated, if price regulation fails to improve welfare, even if one assumes 
a monopoly, then the prospects for beneficial regulation in more competitive 
structures are exceedingly grim. 
We turn now to the evaluation of the effects of regulation under the condi-
tions outlined above—customer-specific markets and monopoly supply.  Our 
analysis reveals that this combination of assumptions introduces an interesting 
wrinkle to the analysis of regulation and pricing flexibility. In particular, if the 
market is a “particular customer’s location” as the FCC has concluded in some 
contexts and as proponents of price regulation appear to argue, then there is 
only one buyer at each location.47 For example, there is only one buyer at a 
carrier’s cell tower.  It follows, then, that there is one seller and one buyer, that 
                                                      
 43 In re Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers, Comments of T-
Mobile USA, Inc., WC Docket No. 05-25, at 6 (Aug. 8, 2007), available at 
http://commcns.org/1waMnyb. 
 44 GAO REPORT (GAO-07-80), supra note 11, at 19. 
 45 BLUHM & LOUBE, supra note 3, at iii. 
 46 The Need for Better Analysis of High Capacity Services, supra note 7, at 345. 
 47 In re Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of 
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,433, 18,449 (Nov. 
17, 2005). 
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is, there is a “bilateral” monopoly.48 Bilateral monopoly does not pre-suppose 
equal bargaining power, and such power may be strongly asymmetrical.49  
Nevertheless, this bilateral monopoly provides an important caveat to the ordi-
nary analysis of deregulation and its welfare consequences. 
 
B. Regulation and Bilateral Monopoly 
 
We consider the following stylized, yet practically relevant scenario. Sup-
pose that a potential seller could choose to install equipment at a certain loca-
tion, which is differentiated from all other locations (to some degree) by space.  
This location could be considered a wire center, tandem, or other network 
node.50 Radiating from this office are numerous potential “branches,” which 
are also spatially unique and have non-zero costs. For present purposes, we can 
take these to represent channel terminations, a stylized arrangement illustrated 















The decision of the firm to locate, or not locate, at this node, as well as 
whether the firm provides certain branches off the node, involves several con-
siderations. First, consistent with the arguments of regulatory proponents, the 
seller, S, has a small “spatial monopoly” in the sense that no other seller would 
                                                      
 48 See generally Roger D. Blair et al., A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral Monopoly, 
55 S. ECON. J. 831 (1989) (analyzing the bilateral monopoly). 
 49 Id. at 836–37. 
 50 Wire centers and tandems are points of traffic aggregation in the telecommunications 
network.  Local distribution plant (e.g., loops) connects to the wire center, and wire centers 
are connected either directly or through tandems. 
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be able to precisely duplicate that location. Second, because of the spatial 
uniqueness of the branches, there exists a countervailing power on the part of 
potential buyers of these connections. In particular, we will imagine that, for a 
given circuit, there is only one potential buyer. Finally, there may well be 
some substantial sunk cost to the seller arising from installing the necessary 
capital equipment at this node. We denote these sunk costs to the seller by K at 
the node, and deal with branch costs later. 
We first focus on the transactions involving the transfer of control of a 
branch from seller to buyer. Clearly, both the node decision and branch trans-
actions are motivated by potential returns to the required investments, which 
returns depend on the form of any regulation of connection prices that may 
apply, as well as the valuations of these services by buyers, along with variable 
costs. Formally, at any given node, there is a “large” collection of i branches, 
each of which are bilateral monopoly markets containing the potential seller, 
denoted S, and a potential buyer at branch i, denoted Bi. The branch is a single, 
indivisible good, denoted Xi. Our interest focuses on those situations in which 
the use of Xi may be transferred from S to Bi, and the prices under which this 
transfer might occur. 
The assumption of a single, indivisible good is for expositional purposes 
alone. At any given location, multiple circuits may be exchanged (for example, 
a few T1s). This “divisibility” of the circuits does not change the basic conclu-
sion of the analysis. The only requirements for our results, as far as this issue 
is concerned, are that (1) there exists bilateral monopoly and, (2) there is free-
dom of pricing/contract terms between buyer and seller. In the case where sev-
eral smaller circuits could do the job of a larger one, the final transaction will 
transfer precisely that collection of elements which generates the greatest gains 
from trade, since this result provides the largest pool of benefits over which 
the buyer and seller can negotiate. In other words, it makes no material differ-
ence whether what is being sold is literally a single, indivisible object or not. 
Assume only one unit of X is transferred (i.e., a circuit). Let bi be the poten-
tial buyer’s reservation price (valuation) of Xi, and let si be the seller’s reserva-
tion value of Xi. Let ci be the cost of the transfer of the use of Xi from S to Bi, 
where ci > 0 (the transfer is not free). We assume that these values are un-
known to the regulator who must, for practical reasons, establish a single statu-
tory price for elements Xi, where i = 1, 2, … N. 
For any given branch, the potential gains from trade are just bi - si - ci, and, 
when those gains are positive, one expects that negotiation between the parties 
will result in a transfer. For example, if the buyer’s reservation value is $100, 
the seller’s reservation value $50, and the cost of transfer is $10, then the gains 
from trade are $100 - $50 - $10 = $40. In the absence of some barrier to trade 
and in the absence of price regulation, we will see transfers in all markets from 
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which positive gains are the result. There is no reason not to trade when there 
are gains from it, regardless of market power on behalf of either buyer or 
seller. It may be the case the seller captures most of the gains from trade, or 
maybe the buyer captures the bulk of the gains, but this distribution is irrele-
vant to measuring total welfare. The trade occurs, and society captures the 
gains from trade. 
To see the uniqueness of this case, we note the following.  First, in the ab-
sence of regulation, trade occurs whenever bi - si - ci > 0. All gains from trade 
are realized by the parties, and welfare (in a partial equilibrium sense) is 
maximized. In contrast, under any regulatory mechanism that produces a sin-
gle price r*, even when that price is judiciously selected to maximize welfare 
(which, in practice, is never the case), some beneficial sales will not occur and 
some welfare-reducing sales will occur. The implication is that there will be 
lower welfare, fewer transactions, and lower investment.51 
For example, if the seller is not required by regulation to complete every 
transaction desired by the buyer, then regulation reduces the number of trans-
actions and welfare.  Consider the following scenario. First, let r* < bi, so the 
buyer wants to exchange.  Second, let r* < si + ci, where the regulated price is 
set below cost. Third, let bi > si + ci, implying a deal outside of regulation 
could be reached.  In this scenario, the seller refuses to transact, even though 
the transaction would occur and generate surplus in the absence of regulation. 
Assume now that a seller is forced to make any exchange that a buyer de-
sires.  Sales will occur only when r* < bi. In instances where si + ci > bi, the 
resulting transfer is value destroying in that the price is less than the cost of 
provision, even though the buyer wants to proceed.52 Under a mandate to sell, 
therefore, there may be sales that are welfare reducing. There may also be 
sales that do not occur, but should. Suppose, for example, that si + ci < bi (both 
parties want to exchange), but r* > bi (the regulated price exceeds the buyer’s 
reservation price). In this case, the regulated price is too high for this given 
pairing to occur, even though both the buyer and seller would wish it to hap-
pen.53  Again, regulation reduces welfare, even if, at very low regulated prices, 
transactions may increase. We note that forcing the seller to make unprofitable 
                                                      
 51 These conclusions are based on the assumption that regulation induces some ineffi-
cient transactions, else regulation has no effect at all. 
 52 For example, let bi = $60, si + ci = $70, and r* = $50.  No trade would occur absent 
regulation, but with regulation the gain from trade is -10 (a social loss). 
 53 For example, let bi = $60, si + ci = $50, and r* = $70.  The buyer does not wish to 
make this transaction even though, without regulation, the buyer and seller would be willing 
to do a deal at a price of, say, $55.  If there is significant flexibility to reduce prices, then 
this case will not generally occur even under regulation. 
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transactions is likely to meet some resistance, such as procedural delays, regu-
latory squabbles, and so forth. If so, resources are wasted fighting over trans-
actions. 
This analysis reveals that unless there is some barrier to trade, in the ab-
sence of regulation the expectation should be for buyer and seller to implement 
first-best, welfare optimal transactions, even under monopoly. It is true that 
one party may prefer a lower or higher price, but this preference is simply a 
squabble over rents and has no effect on total economic welfare. The point is 
made plain by Blair, Kaserman and Romano in their seminal work on Bilateral 
Monopoly: 
[N]egotiation must lead to the maximization of joint profits if the 
firms are to be on the contract curve.  ***  Regardless of how it is 
determined, it is important to note that the price of the . . . good does 
not serve as a rationing device. Instead, it is merely a means of divid-
ing the joint profits.54 
In contrast, under price regulation that establishes either a single price, or a 
price cap, there can be market pairings under which inefficient transactions 
occur, or efficient ones are ruled out.55 In the remaining cases, in which private 
interests align with the regulated price, regulation provides no social benefit, 
since the transaction would occur anyway under negotiation.56 Regulation 
merely forces a transfer from seller to buyer, but the gain to the buyer is equal 
to the loss to the seller. Consequently, regulation only reduces the number of 
transactions and is, by definition, welfare reducing. There is no net gain from 
regulation. 
This analysis is exceedingly important to the debate over special access 
pricing flexibility and is unique in some ways. Ordinarily, regulatory interven-
tion is undertaken to provide something that the unregulated market process 
does not.57 With regard to price regulation, the standard view is that judicious 
price regulation can eliminate welfare losses,58 but this view is based on a vari-
able quantities framework where homogeneous units are sold to atomistic con-
sumers in a centralized marketplace. Whether regulation successfully does so 
in practice is debatable, but that debate is irrelevant here.59 In this analysis, we 
                                                      
 54 Blair, supra note 48, at 839. 
 55 KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPTIMAL REGULATION: THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL 
MONOPOLY 19 (1991). 
 56 Blair, supra note 48, at 834–35. 
 57 TRAIN, supra note 55, at 1. 
 58 Id. at 2–3. 
 59 See generally George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? 
The Case of Electricity, 5 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1962); THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. 
(Footnote Continued. . . .) 
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show, under market conditions consistent with pro-regulation advocacy and 
some FCC decisions, that price regulation can be expected to reduce economic 
welfare even when it is well intentioned and administratively costless to im-
plement. Consequently, price regulation for high capacity services reasonably 
described in this manner should be avoided. In fact, at a time when many claim 
that flexibility should be reduced,60 this analysis suggests that pricing flexibil-
ity should be extended to the entire class of offerings that plausibly meet the 
“particular customer’s location” view of geographic market definition. 
Additionally, while increased regulation is often causally linked to reduced 
investment and welfare, neither theory nor empirics generally support this 
causal relationship.61 Certainly, regulation done poorly, as is often the case, can 
reduce investment levels, output, and welfare.62 Theoretically, though, regula-
tion may increase investment and welfare; it depends on the nature of the regu-
lation. The Averch-Johnson effect, for example, implies that firms will over-
invest in capital equipment in order to increase the absolute level of profits.63  
Regulation, then, increases investment, but to inefficient levels (and possibly 
inefficient capital-to-labor ratios).64 Price cap regulation intends to resolve this 
defect, thereby increasing efficiency and welfare.65 However, to do so, the 
regulation reduces investment.66 
In the standard, variable quantities, central market analysis typical of theory 
and policy debates, regulation has an unambiguous relationship to welfare, 
transactions, or investment.67 Contrariwise, in the presence of bilateral monop-
oly and a fixed quantity, regulation unambiguously reduces welfare and the 
number of transactions,68 which reasonably implies a reduction in the invest-
ment level.  In this regard, “special” access may, in fact, be truly special. 
                                                                                                                              
SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS 
(1997). 
 60 GAO REPORT (GAO-07-80), supra note 11, at 19, 41–42; see also Special Access 
Order, supra note 1, at 10,558–63, 10,572. 
 61 For a useful review of the theory, see chapters 1 and 3 and the appendix on price caps 
in Kenneth Train’s book, OPTIMAL REGULATION.  See TRAIN, supra note 55, at 19–67, 95–
113, 317 app. 
 62 Id. at 20–21. 
 63 Id. at 61. 
 64 Id. at 52. 
 65 Gregory J. Vogt, Cap Sized: How the Promise of the Price Cap Voyage to Competi-
tion Was Lost in a Sea of Good Intentions, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 349, 365 (Mar. 1, 1999). 
 66 Id. at 366. 
 67 Lawrence J. Spiwak, Sending the Wrong Signals on Special Access Deregulation, 
@LAWANDECONOMICS, PHX. CENTER L. & ECON. BLOG (June 22, 2012), 
http://commcns.org/1ilU6Qi. 
 68 Id. 
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C. The Node Decision 
 
In the prior analysis, we ignored the decision about investments in the wire 
center or other network node to which the branches attached. If the node does 
not exist and so the investment is incremental, then the expected profits from 
the sale of branches off the node must be sufficient to cover the node invest-
ment K. That is, for the node to exist, it must be the case that Σ(ti - si - ci) > K, 
where ti is the transaction price at branch i. The reduction in welfare caused by 
regulation reduces the expected total profits of the firm at that node. If these 
total profits are insufficient to cover setup costs K, then the node and its asso-
ciated branches will not exist. The welfare and investment effects could be 
sizeable in such cases. 
It could be argued that all the needed wire centers and nodes already exist 
and that such investments are sunk, so that the node decision is a bygone.  
While the argument has some appeal, it is not without its problems. First, if 
regulators establish a reputation of slashing prices after sunk costs are in-
curred, then the incentive to incur such costs in the future are attenuated. As a 
result, network deployment in future periods is reduced and a dynamic ineffi-
ciency is realized. Second, there are many cases where the node decision is 
incremental, both in creating new nodes and in expanding existing nodes. 
Telecommunications networks are constantly being upgraded, extended and 
expanded, as the current trend is to push fiber deeper into the network, often 
creating new nodes (perhaps to avoid data congestion). If the branches of a 
node are regulated and profits are insufficient to warrant the investment, or 
fear of price cuts in the future that ignore (or take advantage of) sunk costs, 
then fewer nodes will exist.69 And if investments are recurring, then the “qual-
ity” of the node made be reduced, or nodes may be eliminated, if profits are 
insufficient to warrant continued investments. In the end, the practical rele-
vance of the node decision for policy is an empirical one, and beyond the pre-
sent scope. 
Notably, as much of the debate today regarding broadband deployment is 
about expanding the availability of high-capacity circuits in rural markets70 as 
it is about regulating existing circuits. Plainly, absent the sufficient subsidies to 
                                                      
 69 Paul Levine et al., Utility Price Regulation and Time Inconsistency: Comparisons 
with Monetary Policy, 57 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 447, 449 (2005). 
 70 Lawrence J. Spiwak, The FCC’s Special Access Fiasco: No Data and Wrong Policy 
Questions, @LAWANDECONOMICS, PHX. CENTER L. & ECON. BLOG (Aug. 24, 2012), 
http://commcns.org/S9KLVd. 
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make such deployment profitable, creation of new capacity and new circuits 
will not be served well by price regulation. 
 
D. Posting Price with Flexibility 
 
There is evidence, at least for some carriers, that posted prices under flexi-
bility are higher than those under regulation. The NRRI (2009) and 
GAO (2006) studies are examples, but there are others.71 While there are many 
explanations for these price differences, it is worth observing why this might 
occur in light of our theoretical framework. 
Welfare is largest under pricing flexibility because bargaining is possible, so 
that all transactions occur that produce gains from trade. If we consider a 
posted price as a first offer, then from a practical perspective we should expect 
the posted price to be high. Why? Because for sellers, “negotiating up” is not 
typically an option. Flexibility, then, only implies downward flexibility if a 
price is posted. If many buyers are paying less than the posted prices, and there 
is some evidence to support this practice, then our analysis may explain, in 
part, the trend in prices. 
Another explanation is that the relaxation of regulation has allowed sellers 
to better exploit their bargaining power. However, this interpretation of the 
data does not imply a welfare reduction, but merely a transfer between buyers 
and sellers. We discuss that point in the next section. 
 
E. Dividing the Gains from Trade 
 
From a theoretical perspective, in this analysis a transaction occurs when 
there are gains to trade, but how those gains are distributed between buyer and 
seller is another issue. There are many potential outcomes of the bargaining 
process. In the Nash Bargaining Solution, the gains will be split equally be-
tween buyer and seller; this arises, in part, from the assumption of symmetric 
bargaining power.72 If bargaining strength is not symmetric, then other distri-
butions can occur.73 
                                                      
 71 In re Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI. Inc., Applications for Approval of 
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R 18,433, 18,449–50 
(Nov. 17, 2005). 
 72 John F. Nash, Jr., Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games, 36 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
48, 48–49 (1950); Ken Binmore et al., The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Model-
ing, 17 RAND J. ECON. 176, 186 (1986). 
 73 Nash, Jr., supra note 72, at 48–49; Binmore, supra note 72, at 186–87. 
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In this light, our analysis suggests that much of the debate over pricing 
flexibility is simply a squabble over the distribution of rents. A review of the 
pro-regulatory arguments suggests that this distributional issue is prevalent, if 
not driving. Our analysis shows the profound error in this logic.  For every $1 
in gains transferred by price regulation from seller to buyer, not only does the 
seller lose $1, but there is an additional welfare loss. Making the buyer $1 bet-
ter off makes others more than $1 worse off. So, while distributional concerns 
may be legitimate, the cost of implementing a transfer of wealth from buyer to 
seller is high, and necessarily higher than the benefits. In other words, the 
regulator may worry about distribution, but doing something about it is proba-
bly too costly. 
 
F. Comparison to the Textbook Monopoly Case 
 
We recognize that our findings may be surprising and possibly even confus-
ing. Clearly, our claims are not those typical to discussions on regulation, 
which in the U.S. are consistently motivated by the familiar, textbook variable 
quantities monopoly framework with atomistic (or many) buyers.74 This sce-
nario is not applicable to high capacity services.75 It is important to recognize 
the role that the indivisibility of the objects being traded plays in this analysis, 
since it is not the “textbook” case of market power. 
In the standard treatment, whenever both market power and variable quanti-
ties exist, there is always the potential for inefficient equilibria due to the in-
ability of the party with market power to extract surplus from otherwise so-
cially beneficial transactions. Put simply, when only one price is charged and 
quantities are variable, output is reduced to raise prices and profits, creating 
welfare losses. Panel A in Figure 2 illustrates this standard, textbook case of 
monopoly with variable quantities: The monopolist faces demand curve D and 
produces the item at marginal cost MC. The welfare maximizing output is QC, 
which is sold at price PC, where price is equal to marginal cost.  This is also 
the perfectly competitive equilibrium. A profit-maximizing monopolist prefers 
price PM and reduces quantity to QM to achieve it. The area labeled T is the 
                                                      
 74 Regulation of Natural Monopoly, BOUNDLESS (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://commcns.org/1kiPrnc. 
 75 We applied this variable quantity framework in an econometric analysis of pricing 
for DS0 circuits in our paper. Set It and Forget It?, supra note 7. These smaller circuits may 
be more sensibly analyzed in this framework, since they are low priced and low capacity 
services for which transaction-specific negotiations are unlikely. Id. It seems clear, how-
ever, that high capacity circuits to cell towers cannot be evaluated in a variable quantities 
framework. Id. 
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transfer from buyers to seller and is equal to profit, and the triangle D is the 
deadweight loss of monopoly, or the welfare that neither buyer nor seller cap-
ture. The area D represents the loss to society of market power, and it is this 
loss that justifies regulatory intervention. 
Here, the monopolist holds back output in order to raise price and increase 
profits. But, for every $1 of higher profits, consumers lose more than $1 of 
surplus. The gain to the monopolist is a transfer from buyer to the seller (rec-
tangular area T in Panel A), but there is also a deadweight loss of welfare that 
is uncaptured by any market participant (triangle D in Panel A), since price is 
set above marginal cost. Consumers lose T + D, but the monopolist gains only 
T. At the monopoly price, beneficial trade is possible since buyers are willing 
to pay more than costs, but such transactions are lost when the monopolist sets 
a single price to maximize profit. (Importantly and rarely acknowledged is the 
fact that monopoly is not inefficient, per se; rather, a monopolist charging a 
uniform price is inefficient.76 If the monopolist can charge each buyer its res-


















In this textbook case, price regulation aims to reduce the monopolists’ price 
in an effort to capture a portion of this deadweight loss. For every $1 reduction 
in price, more than $1 is gained by consumers (a part of T is transferred to 
                                                      
 76 Peter T. Leeson & Russell S. Sobel, Costly Price Discrimination, 99 ECON. LETTERS 
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buyers, and they also gain a part of D), so regulation makes sense, at least in a 
naïve, textbook analysis. Of course, regulation is neither costless nor perfect, 
and these realities must be considered when evaluating intervention in the real 
world. In many cases, the distortions resulting from regulation exceed any wel-
fare gains from regulatory action since regulators are imperfect and frequently 
politically motivated.77 
With bilateral monopoly and variable quantities, the case is more complex, 
but there is no ex ante assumption that the outcome will be jointly profit 
maximizing, or otherwise efficient.78 But, the failings of the bilateral solution 
to obtain an efficient outcome largely vanish when there is a single unit of an 
indivisible good exchanged, such as a channel termination. In general, coop-
erative bargaining models, such as that of the Nash Bargaining Solution, take 
Pareto optimality of the solution as an axiom.79  So left to themselves, one may 
assume that the buyer and seller in any given market will, in fact, make a 
transaction when there are gains from doing so, even if all the gains are cap-
tured by one party or the other. In other words, as long as there are gains to 
trade available, trade will occur in an unregulated environment. 
Imagine a case where a circuit exists on a farm where a cell tower has been 
located. There is no party interested in buying that circuit other than the cell 
phone carrier; there is only one seller (by assumption), and there is only one 
circuit. The two parties agree to exchange use of the circuit, or it lays fallow.  
In this case, the monopolist cannot manipulate price by adjusting quantity, or 
give up lower valuation buyers to extract rents from the higher valuation buy-
ers as in the variable quantities case. In such bargaining situations, as long as 
there is a buyer with a greater value for the item than the seller, both seller and 
                                                      
 77 See Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects of Economic Regulation, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1450, 1451, 1454, 1487 (Richard Schmalensee 
& Robert Willig eds., 1989). For example, Joskow and Rose assert that: 
[R]egulation may introduce political considerations into input choice decisions.  This will 
apply to non-labor inputs as well as labor inputs. For example, utilities may be subject to 
political pressures to buy local products (e.g., coal), rather than cheaper substitutes from 
suppliers in other states, to bolster the local economy. Depending on the state, they might 
also come under pressure to use unionized employees when they otherwise might not, or to 
sign lavish wage agreements. 
Id. at 1490. 
 78 F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 300 
(2d ed. 1980). As observed by Scherer and Ross, “We see that what happens under bilateral 
monopoly depends in part upon whether the buyer or seller exercises price leadership.  Nei-
ther of these leadership solutions, however, is consistent with joint profit maximization [and 
the] joint profit-maximizing quantity might also be achieved if one party can successfully 
pursue a ‘take it or leave it’ strategy.” Id. 
 79 Nash, Jr., supra note 72, at 48–49. 
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buyer gain from trade. The profit maximizing solution for both is to find some 
price at which the trade occurs. Otherwise, money (or welfare) is left on the 
table. 
Panel B illustrates the case we have here. There is but one item to trade, 
with buyer value b and seller value s.  If b > s, there are gains from trade. At 
some price between b and s, both parties agree to trade and both will gain, and 
the welfare potential (area G) will be realized. If there is no trade, both parties 
receive nothing and leave the gains unrealized. Of course, the distribution of 
these gains depends on where the price is set between b and s, and this deci-
sion depends on the bargaining power of the parties. If the price is set closer to 
b, then the seller gets most of the surplus. If the price is set close to s, then the 
buyer gets most of the surplus. For the Nash Bargaining Solution (symmetric 
bargaining power), the price is set at the midpoint between b and s. But what-
ever the end price, welfare is maximized by trading. 
If the seller has more bargaining power, then the seller will capture more of 
the gains from trade and price will be closer to b than s. In the special access 
debate, the debate over price regulation appears directed mainly at enforcing a 
transfer of rents from the ILEC sellers to the buyers. In this bilateral frame-
work, it is easy to see that this is the only possible explanation for dispute. As 
we have shown, any effort to enforce such a transfer reduces overall welfare, 
costing society more than $1 for every $1 transferred. As a result, price regula-
tion of high capacity services, and in particular channel terminations that are 
more frequently and sensibly characterized as location specific markets, should 
be avoided (not only in the Top 50 MSAs, but all areas).80 
Figure 2, Panel A, can be used to provide a rough analogy to the bilateral 
monopoly case of Figure 2, Panel B. Though an imperfect analogy for a num-
ber of reasons, it nevertheless may help with comprehension. In the textbook 
case of a monopolist selling a homogeneous output to many buyers, the wel-
fare maximizing solution can be obtained under first-degree price discrimina-
tion.81 That is, the monopolist sells its output to each customer at the cus-
tomer’s reservation price (the highest price the customer is willing to pay).  
Doing so renders the welfare maximizing quantity QC and there is no dead-
                                                      
 80 The Need for Better Analysis of High Capacity Services, supra note 7, at 345. 
 81 Dirk Bergemann et al., The Limits of Price Discrimination 2 (Princeton Univ. Econ. 
Theory Ctr., Research Paper No. 052-2013, May 14, 2013) (“[I]f the monopolist has com-
plete information about the valuation of the buyers, then he can completely segment the 
market according to true valuations. This results in perfect or first degree price discrimina-
tion. The resulting allocation is efficient, but consumer surplus is zero and the producer 
captures all of the gains from efficient trade.”). 
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weight loss. However, all surplus is captured by the monopolist. First-degree 
price discrimination illustrates the idea that it is not monopoly that is ineffi-
cient, but monopoly selling at a uniform price. While roughly analogous in 
that it demonstrates the problem with assuming monopoly is inefficient, per se, 
there are many differences in this example and the case of bilateral monopoly 
we consider. First, in the situation we examine, we do not have atomistic buy-
ers and the good sold is heterogeneous. Further, for small purchases, the trans-
actions costs of pulling off perfect price discrimination are likely to offset any 
increase in profitability. Special access is not a “small” purchase. 
 
III. Numerical Simulation of the Theory 
 
We recognize that the implications of the theoretical argument above may 
be difficult to grasp, particularly given the heavy reliance of policy debates on 
exceedingly simple economic models of regulation. The idea that regulation 
necessarily reduces welfare even if regulators are right-minded, informed, and 
their actions are costless, is a strong claim. When the concepts are difficult, 
numerical examples often aid comprehension. So we provide a numerical 
simulation of the theory here, which is essentially a fancy numerical example. 
 
A. Simulation Setup 
 
Our interest is in the effects of regulation on welfare and the number of 
transactions in a setting of bilateral monopoly with the exchange of a single 
good. Since investments are plausibly related to transactions, we can also 
make some claims about investment levels and regulation. To begin, we as-
sume there are 100 potential branches at some given node, and we will focus 
only on this node. This setup allows us to determine how many of the branches 
are served with and without price regulation. Next, we need to assign values of 
bi, si, and ci, so we can decide when transactions will occur and compute the 
gains from trade. For variety in these values, we generate independent random 
variables to represent the reservation values for both buyers and sellers (bi and 
si from above). The average of seller valuation is assumed to be lower than 
buyer valuation, just so a significant number of transactions occur. These val-
ues are randomly generated from the χ2 distribution with 10 degrees of free-
dom for buyers and 5 degrees of freedom for the seller. The average valuations 
will be closely approximated by the degrees of freedom. Consistency with the 
predictions of the theoretical model is not related to the scale of the reservation 
values. Lastly, we assume the cost of the transaction, ci, is a constant equal to 
1.0, and this cost is actually incurred by the seller. These are the only inputs 
required to simulate the theory. 
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Under pricing flexibility, a transaction occurs for those branches for which 
bi > si + ci. Total welfare is simply the sum of bi - si - ci across all transactions.  
Since total welfare is the sum of the buyer and seller surplus, we ignore dis-
tributional issues for now. Under the benchmark case, 74 of 100 branches are 
exchanged and total welfare is 462 units. 
The effect of regulation is measured by evaluating transactions and welfare 
at a regulated price, r*. We assume the transaction occurs only when r* > bi 
and r* > si + ci, so the seller can refuse transactions. To avoid assumptions 
about how the regulated price is set, we simply evaluate the number of transac-
tions and welfare at all potential prices.82 
 
B. Results with Seller’s Right to Refuse 
 
The results of the simulation are illustrated in Figure 3. In Panel A, we see 
that the aggregate economic welfare with regulation always lies below welfare 
under no regulation. As expected, “no regulation” dominates regulation at any 
price. In Panel B, we see that the number of transactions is lower under regula-
tion than without regulation, which was also predicted by the theory. If trans-
actions require investments, then investment likewise will decline.  This dem-
onstration of the theoretical results confirms that regulation (of any type) both 
















                                                      
 82 We consider integer prices only, but this has no effect on the results. 
No regulation 
Figure 3.  Simulation Results (Seller can refuse transactions) 
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 Welfare in the unregulated state was 462 units and there are 74 transactions.  
At the peak of the regulated welfare, there are 368 units and 46 transactions.  
Note, however, that these figures are based on the assumed and arbitrary dis-
tributions of the simulation and are not representative of the expected welfare 
losses from regulation. 
 
C. Results with Seller Mandate to Provide 
 
In Figure 4 we illustrate the results under the assumption the seller cannot 
refuse a transaction when the buyer is willing. As before, welfare is always 
lower under regulation, which is illustrated in Figure 4, Panel A. Because 
regulation can force transactions that are welfare reducing (r* < si + ci), Panel 
B shows that transactions may increase at very low prices.  At plausible regu-
lated prices (those not below cost on average), transactions are typically fewer 
than in the deregulated state, although this depends in part on the assumed dis-
tributions of values. However, seller profits are negative in most of these 
cases, so the firm would not operate at these low prices and no service would 
be sold at all. Interestingly, the seller earns negative profits at the welfare 
maximizing regulated price, so welfare maximization would not be an option 
for the regulator unless a transfer is arranged between buyers and sellers. But, 
again, these values are based on the arbitrary distributions of the valuations 
demonstrating only possibilities. The decline in welfare, whether or not the 



















Panel A: Economic Welfare Panel B: Transactions 
Regulated price, r* Regulated price, r* 
Trans. Wel. 
No regulation 
With regulation  With regulation  
Figure 4.  Simulation Results (Seller cannot refuse transactions) 
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As a practical matter, the seller may find ways to avoid forced transactions, 
using regulatory proceedings, litigation, procedural delays, and so forth. Re-
sources will be spent doing so, however, so this does not alter the fundamental 
result on welfare. Regulation reduces welfare. The negative and low profits at 
low regulated prices also may affect node investments, as discussed above. 
From Figure 4, and to some extent from Figure 3, it is easy to see that the 
empirical observation that quantity rises when prices decline is not a reliable 
measure of the welfare effects of regulation (in contrast to the variable quanti-
ties framework). In a situation like Figure 4, Panel B, the number of transac-
tions fall as the regulated price rises; lower prices render higher quantities con-
sistent with the law of demand. But from Figure 4, Panel A, we see that wel-
fare is always lower in the regulated state. In fact, even in the regulated state, it 
is possible for welfare to move in the opposite direction as quantity, as hap-
pens in Figure 4 at the lower end of the price range. Our conclusion that regu-
lation reduces welfare and that there is no deadweight loss in the bilateral con-
text we contemplate, cannot be discounted simply because price and aggregate 
quantity are inversely related in practice. Put simply, a regulatory slashing of 
prices need not improve welfare, even if quantity rises. This finding also casts 
doubt on the conclusions of studies making welfare arguments based on 
econometrically estimated demand curves for high-capacity services that con-
ceptually rely on a variable quantities framework.83 
 
D. Distribution of Gains 
 
As we discussed in Section III.E above, the theory says nothing about how 
gains are distributed between buyer and seller, only that trade occurs when 
gains are positive. Much of the debate over special access pricing flexibility 
appears to be related to the distribution of gains, and not some overall welfare 
argument. We also noted that for every $1 in regulation-induced increase in 
the profits of the buyer, there is always more than $1 reduction in the well-
being of the seller and the rest of society. Therefore, mandated redistributions 
of gains necessarily flunk the cost-benefit test. 
We can demonstrate the cost-benefit calculation using the simulation. Keep 
in mind, however, that the values in the simulation are arbitrarily selected.  
                                                      
 83 Shauntian Yao & Lydia Gan, Monopoly Innovation and Welfare Effects, 4 ECON.: 
OPEN-ACCESS, OPEN-ASSESSMENT E-J. 1, 8 (2010), available at 
http://commcns.org/1pcfqPH. 
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Size does not matter; the only question is whether the welfare costs exceed the 
benefits from a transfer. 
The welfare costs of the transfer are computed by assuming all gains are 
captured by the seller in the deregulated state, and all gains are captured by the 
buyer in the regulated state. With this assumption, the change in welfare for 
every $1 in transfer to the buyer is simply the ratio of the total welfare in the 
deregulated to the regulated state. Around plausible average price points, we 
compute that for every $1 transfer of gains to the buyer, there is about a $1.4 
reduction in the well-being of all others.84 As expected from the theory, the 
costs exceed the benefits of regulation. This trade-off is a direct consequence 
of the assumed distribution, and should not be considered an estimate of the 




The debate over whether high-capacity services should be subject to price 
regulation has raged for nearly fifteen years.85 To date, this debate has largely 
focused on whether there are sufficient competitive alternatives to warrant 
pricing flexibility and also on the geographic scope of any such deregulation.86  
In this article, we show that under common characterizations of high capacity 
services, the core components of this debate are essentially irrelevant to the 
question as to whether price regulation would improve economic welfare. In-
deed, if one assumes that high capacity services are provided by monopoly 
providers in highly granular, point-to-point markets (as proponents of special 
access regulation argue), then price regulation reduces welfare and probably 
reduces investment in communications infrastructure. 
Our conclusions are based on an economic analysis of the exchange of a 
single good (i.e., a circuit or group of circuits) in the setting of bilateral mo-
nopoly, which is the scenario best matching the common characterizations of 
high capacity services markets by FCC decisions and those seeking regulation 
of these services.87 Our analysis suggests that nearly the entire body of empiri-
cal evidence and the standard conceptual arguments used to support increased 
                                                      
 84 We compute the trade-off only at points with relatively high welfare and in the range 
of plausible average prices for transactions in the deregulated state. 
 85 The Need for Better Analysis of High Capacity Services, supra note 7, at 344. 
 86 Id. at 355–56. 
 87 See discussion supra Part II.A; see also In re Verizon Communications Inc. and 
MCI, Inc. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,433, 18,449 & n.90 (Nov. 17, 2005) (concluding that a “particular 
customer’s location” is the market and citing the proponents of that conclusion). 
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regulation for high capacity services are irrelevant. Under the conditions as-
sumed, regulation reduces welfare, even if regulation is costless. 
Most will find these results surprising, and many will find them frustrating 
or even unnerving. We stress that our findings derive from what we consider 
to be a fairly standard view over how high capacity services are ordered, pro-
vided, and consumed. The implications of our results are straightforward.  
First, under the conditions we describe, regulatory oversight over the provision 
of high capacity services by incumbents can essentially be eliminated, without 
fear of reductions in aggregate welfare. Second, there is hope that for this im-
portant class of service, the FCC can simultaneously satisfy the twin goals of 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act to “promote competition and reduce regula-
tion” with regard to high capacity services.88 We believe that policies that 
would promote entry of alternative high capacity service networks, including 
adjusting spectrum policy, access to poles, ducts, conduits, rights-of-way, and 
facilitating demand aggregation, will cut prices for end-users by reducing the 
number of locations of which there are monopoly sources of supply. Price 
regulation, alternately, may discourage competitive entry by reducing expected 
profits in the post-entry equilibrium.89 As always, the trade-offs must be con-
templated and, ideally, quantified. 
Our approach is focused upon maximizing welfare, which we believe is the 
proper method for making regulatory decisions in most settings. One risk of 
the regulatory state is that this balance may get lost if proponents of any one 
particular policy engage in rent-seeking lobbying or advocacy. A rigorous 
cost-benefit analysis focuses attention upon the overall good, and not simply 
upon the effects of a proposal upon the profits of one industry segment. A 
formal cost-benefit analysis of regulation helps ensure that policymakers not 
become enraptured by attention-grabbing talking points and instead insist that 
advocates provide a full and complete accounting of the real costs and benefits 
of any proposed regulatory action that are consistent with economic theory. 
                                                      
 88 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996). 
 89 We use the word “may” with intention.  High capacity services are sometimes pur-
chased as an input.  As such, lower prices may encourage entry under certain conditions.  
The question is empirical because there are conflicting effects (substitution and complemen-
tarity, jointly) of lower prices. See generally T. Randolph Beard et al., Mandated Access 
and the Make-or-Buy Decision: The Case of Local Telecommunications Competition, 45 Q. 
REV. ECON. & FIN. 28 (2004). 
